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Essay
Injury Without Harm: Texas v.
Lesage and the Strange World of
Article III Injuries
BY ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT*
On November 29, 1999 the Supreme Court issued its unanimous
per curiam opinion in Texas v. Lesage,1 summarily reversing an
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Lesage is by all indications an obscure and seemingly insignificant
constitutional decision. The opinion deals with a relatively narrow
issue of the law of constitutional remedies: whether a plaintiff denied
admission at a state university whose admissions process makes
unconstitutional use of race is entitled to monetary damages under 42
U.S.C. §1983 if the defendant school can demonstrate that the
plaintiff would have been denied admission even if race had not been
used as a criterion. The Supreme Court answered "no," and reversed
the Fifth Circuit,2 but apparently did not consider the issue
sufficiently interesting or important to merit full briefing and
argumentation. Indeed, the Court claimed to be making no new law,
but rather simply applying in a new context its twenty-two year-old
decision in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
<bhagwata@uchastings.edu>. Thanks to Bill Dodge, Evan Lee, and David Levine for
extremely helpful comments and suggestions.
1. 528 U.S. 18 (1999).
2. As discussed further below, infra Part III, the Court's holding did not preclude
such a plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief.
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Doyle,3 which similarly restricted damages claims by public employees
for violations of their First Amendment rights.
On its face, therefore, the Lesage decision appears both hum-
drum and unproblematic. After all, it seems obvious that a plaintiff
should not be entitled to money damages if the defendant can prove,
in the words of the Court, "that the government would have made the
same decision regardless," since then "there is no cognizable injury."4
There is, however, something odd and frankly perplexing about the
Court's holding in Lesage, when considered in light of the Court's
extant jurisprudence regarding Article III standing and the nature of
the constitutional "injury in fact" suffered by plaintiffs who allege
violations of the Equal Protection Clause. As it turns out, the result
in Lesage is not unproblematic at all; rather, when examined closely
the case reveals deep fissures and internal contradictions within the
Court's opinions in this area. Indeed, the language of the Lesage
opinion itself highlights these contradictions, without addressing or
resolving them. This essay has the modest objectives of exposing
these internal contradictions in the Court's Equal Protection/Standing
jurisprudence, and to offer some tentative thoughts as to a few
possible resolutions.
I. Standing, Article 11, and Injuries-in-Fact
It is well-accepted, black-letter law today (no matter how
controversial in academic circles) that in order to meet the strictures
of the "case and controversy" requirement of Article III, a plaintiff in
federal court must, at a constitutional minimum, prove that she has
suffered "personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."5
At the core of this rule is the requirement of "injury in fact": "an
invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized... , and (b) 'actual or imminent."' 6  Despite this
seemingly settled definition, however, the Court has continuously
struggled with the exact meaning of the term "injury in fact." The
following are just some issues that, in the past few years, the Court
has considered, and often sharply disagreed about: whether members
of Congress (and other legislators) have suffered a cognizable "injury
3. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
4. 528 U.S. at 20.
5. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984).
6. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
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in fact" when the power of Congress as an institution is reduced,
thereby reducing the effective power of individual legislators,
whether denial of information sought by individuals pursuant to the
Federal Election Campaign Act constitutes an injury in fact; whether
qui tam plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact;9 and whether an
environmental plaintiff continues to suffer injury in fact when a
defendant ceases its polluting activities during the course of
litigation."
One question in the standing area which the Court has had
particular difficulty coming to grips with is the extent to which the
concept of an "injury" has some sort of a natural, prelegal meaning,
or is instead a purely legal concept. This is an issue of great
importance because it has tremendous implications for the power of
Congress to authorize lawsuits by creating and defining newly
actionable injuries. The Court's internal divisions on this question,
and their practical importance, are displayed sharply in the important
decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife." The majority opinion by
Justice Scalia, the Court's foremost proponent of the standing
doctrine and of a naturalistic approach to "injury," clearly
understands injury in fact as something real, which exists, or does not
exist, quite independent of legal context or underlying, substantive
law. Thus, Justice Scalia states that to satisfy the injury in fact
requirement, a plaintiff must make "a factual showing of perceptible
harm, '' 1 and that Congress cannot eliminate the minimum
requirement that federal plaintiffs have actually suffered a "de facto,"
"concrete" injury -- that they have been "injured in fact."" Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion, in contrast, takes quite a different
approach to injuries: "In my view, Congress has the power to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case
7. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
8. Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
9. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765 (2000).
10. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S.
167 (2000).
11. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
12. Id. at 566.
13. Id. at 566, 576, 578 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia's recent opinion for the
Court in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765 (2000), upholding standing in qui tam cases, is not inconsistent with this position,
because the basis for the holding in that case was assignment to the qui tam plaintiff of the
government's claim (based on an uncontroverted injury in fact), not recognition of injury
to the plaintiff himself. See id. at 771-75.
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or controversy where none existed before."'4 The notion expressed
here, that Congress can create an injury which would satisfy
constitutional standing requirements, is anathema to the idea
expressed by Justice Scalia that the concept of an injury has a
minimum, natural component which has been incorporated into
Article III. As Cass Sunstein has nicely put it, the underlying
disagreement here is whether "there is a way, entirely independent of
law, of figuring out whether a litigant has been 'injured' at all."'"
Sunstein argues, convincingly in my view, that in fact (pun intended)
there is no way to distinguish without some legal framework between
injuries which exist "in fact," and those that do not." He goes on to
argue that in its 1998 decision in Federal Election Commission v.
Akins, 7 the Supreme Court moved far towards adopting just such an
approach towards injury. 8 Ultimately, as Sunstein and many other
scholars have noted, if one rejects the naturalistic view of injury in
fact, then the question of standing largely folds into the legal question
of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action rooted in the common
law or a statute. Of course, such a view of standing entirely
eliminates its significance as a doctrine, grounded in the doctrine of
separation of powers, which imposes important limits on Congress'
power to shift authority between the branches of government. This,
no doubt, explains the resistance of at least some members of the
Court to adopt such an approach? °
H. Affirmative Action and the "Opportunity to Compete"
The struggle over the nature of justiciable injuries has been
especially important in cases involving the Equal Protection Clause of
14. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
15. Cass Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613,640 (1999).
16. Id. at 641.
17. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
18. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 641-43.
19. ld. at 638-39; See William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221,
229 (1988); David Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 S. Cr. REV. 41; Lee Albert,
Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for
Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 485-86 n.290, 491-92 & n.317 (1974); Henry P. Monaghan,
ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L. 1363, 1381 (1973).
20. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 750-52 (O'Connor, J.); Federal Election
Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. at 36-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Part of Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
881 (1983).
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the Fourteenth Amendment and, in particular, in, cases where white
plaintiffs have challenged affirmative action programs and other
benign, race-conscious government programs. This is because in the
leading cases challenging such programs, the plaintiff is typically
unable to prove that he or she would have received the benefits being
dispensed by the challenged program if the government had not
considered race, and thus has been unable to prove that the use of
race in these programs actually deprived the plaintiff of some tangible
benefit. The Court, however, has consistently and flatly rejected the
argument that this is an impediment to standing.
Thus, in the leading case of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, the Court faced an argument that Bakke, an
applicant to the University of California at Davis Medical School,
lacked standing to challenge the school's affirmative action program
because he could not demonstrate that he would have been admitted
absent the program. The Court responded (albeit off-handedly, in a
footnote) as follows:
The constitutional element of standing is plaintiff's
demonstration of any injury to himself that is likely to be
redressed by favorable decision of his claim. The trial court
found such an injury, apart from failure to be admitted, in the
University's decision not to permit Bakke to compete for al 100
places in the class, simply because of his race. Hence the
constitutional requirements of Art. III were met. The question
of Bakke's admission vel non is merely one of relief.2
1
The Court was faced squarely with the standing issue in
Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of
America v. City of Jacksonville, involving an association of general
contractors suing to challenge a minority set-aside program for city
contracts. Once again, the standing problem arose because the
plaintiffs could not prove that they would have been awarded any
contracts absent the program, and on this basis the Court of Appeals
had rejected standing, finding that the plaintiffs had suffered no
injury. The Supreme Court squarely rejected this argument, holding
that:
[t]he 'injury in fact' in an equal protection case of this variety is
the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of
the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit ....
And in the context of a challenge to a set-aside program, the
'injury in fact' is the inability to compete on an equal footing in
21. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,281 n.14 (1978).
22. 508 U.S. 656,666 (1993).
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the bidding process, not the loss of a contract.23
Finally, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena,24 the Court relied on its
holding in Jacksonville once again to permit a contractor to challenge
a race-conscious preference program for government contracts (in
this instance, a federal program), despite the fact that the plaintiff
contractor could not prove that it would actually receive any contracts
absent the program.
Together, these cases establish that at least in the equal
protection context, in order to establish standing and injury in fact, a
plaintiff need not allege the loss of a tangible benefit. Instead, the
loss of opportunity to compete equally itself constitutes a sufficient
injury. It should be noted that the injury in these cases was not the
denial of an opportunity to apply or compete for a benefit at all,
because in none of these cases was the plaintiff completely excluded
from applying for, and being considered for, the benefit at issue.
Indeed, the Adarand case did not involve any sort of a numerical set-
aside, so the plaintiff was not prevented from competing for any
particular contract. Instead, the injury was the loss of opportunity to
compete equally, the deprivation of equality itself.
Two important results follow from the Court's holdings in this
area. First, it becomes clear that the nature of constitutionally
cognizable injuries must depend on the substantive area of law at
issue. It seems quite obvious that loss of equal opportunity alone
would not constitute a sufficient injury in fact in areas of law other
than equal protection. In the First Amendment context, for example,
it is hard to imagine the Court permitting a challenge to proceed
against a city's licensure program for the use of its parks, streets, or
sidewalks unless the plaintiff demonstrates that it actually intends to
use the space for First Amendment-protected activities and has a
reasonable probability of being permitted to do so. Loss of
"opportunity," or even "equal opportunity" to use the property
would not be enough, if it was reasonably clear that ultimately no
expressive activity would occur.' Similarly, in the environmental
context the Court will not permit a plaintiff to sue to stop a defendant
from polluting a particular piece of land on the grounds that the
plaintiff has lost the opportunity to use the land because of the
pollution; the plaintiff must demonstrate that she actually intends to
23. Md at 666.
24. 515 U.S. 200,211 (1995).
25. Cf City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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use the particular, affected area. 6
Second, the Court's affirmative action decisions demonstrate that
language in the Lujan opinion and other cases indicating that Article
III requires plaintiffs to suffer a "concrete" rather than an abstract
injury cannot be taken too literally. After all, "the denial of equal
treatment" and "the inability to compete on an equal footing" seem
on their face to be quite abstract injuries. But, presumably because of
the constitutional significance of the equality concept, as expressed in
the Equal Protection Clause, they are sufficiently concrete for Article
III purposes.27
III. Lesage: Injury Without Compensation
Now we come to the Court's decision in Texas v. Lesage.2 In
Lesage, the Court held that when a plaintiff challenges an affirmative
action program (in this instance, a graduate school which used race as
a criterion in student admissions), he cannot recover any money
damages if the government defendant can prove that the plaintiff
would not have received the benefit at issue (in Lesage, admission)
even if the government had used a race-neutral decision process. The
Court summarized its holding as follows:
Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental
decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is
undisputed that the government would have made the same
decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting
relief under § 1983.29
The Court goes on to note, however, that
[o]f course, a plaintiff who challenges an ongoing race-
conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not
affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in
question if race were not considered. The relevant injury in
26. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
27. The standing issues raised in affirmative action cases have important and obvious
parallels with the Court's jurisprudence, and academic debate, regarding whether white
voters should have standing to challenge so-called "racial gerrymandering," the
intentional creation of legislative districts where minority voters constitute a majority.
Compare David R. Dow, The Equal Protection Clause and the Legislative Redistricting
Cases - Some Notes Concerning the Standing of White Plaintiffs, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1123
(1997) (arguing against granting standing to white voters to challenge the creation of
majority minority electoral districts) with John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-
Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 576 (1997) (suggesting that the Court's
decisions granting such voters standing are defensible, and indeed clearly correct).
28. 528 U.S. 18 (1999).
29. 528 U.S. at 20.
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such cases is "the inability to compete on an equal footing."30
Of course. Notice what the Court is saying in Lesage (in its
inimitably terse manner): Article III permits a plaintiff to seek an
injunction to stop an on-going affirmative action program even if the
injunction will not result in the plaintiff acquiring any tangible
benefit. The relevant injury in such cases is
the inability to compete on an equal footing. But where there is
no allegation of an ongoing or imminent constitutional violation
to support a claim for forward-looking relief, the government's
conclusive demonstration that it would have made the same
decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes any finding
of liability.3
In the latter type of case, where the only remedy sought is damages,
"there is no cognizable injury."32  This last phrase highlights the
mystery of the Lesage decision because, despite what the Court says
here, Francois Lesage had been denied "equal treatment" by the
University of Texas when it took account of his race in considering
and denying his application, regardless of whether he was planning to
reapply to the University in the future. The past injury he had
suffered was no different from the threatened injury which, according
to the Court, would have permitted him to seek injunctive relief.
Nonetheless, the Court held that he was not entitled to damages
because his injury was not "cognizable." Lesage may have had a right
but he had no remedy, proving John Marshall wrong again?
The Court is thus defining cognizable "injury" in two completely
different and inconsistent ways in Lesage. The "inability to compete
on an equal footing," or in the language of Associated General
Contractors v. Jacksonville, "the denial of equal treatment" 34 is an
injury for Article III purposes, at least when the plaintiff is seeking
injunctive relief. But it is not an injury for the purposes of damages
liability under §1983. The question is, why?
One possibility is that the disjunction reflects some peculiarity
30. Id. (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America
v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)).
31. Id. at 19-22 (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of
America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666 (1993)).
32. Id at 20.
33. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right.").
34. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v.
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666.
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about 42 U.S.C. §1983, the statutory basis for Lesage's damages
action. After all, the Court did say that Lesage had not suffered a
'cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983."' 5 This, however, is
an unlikely explanation for the Court's holding. There is nothing in
the text of § 1983 indicating that Congress intended to narrow the
range of otherwise actionable injuries which would be compensable
through damages under § 1983.36 Furthermore, when a plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief against a state affirmative action program, § 1983 is
also the basis for the suit, and there is nothing in the text of § 1983
suggesting that the nature of the relief sought should affect a
plaintiff's ability to invoke the statute - the statute authorizes "an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress"
without distinguishing between the various forms of relief.7 Finally,
when plaintiffs challenge federal affirmative action programs, §1983
will not normally provide a basis for relief. Rather, any damages
liability must presumably be based on some sort of a Bivens type of
action."s Yet it seems extraordinarily unlikely that the Court will
permit money damages against the federal government in situations,
such as in Lesage, where a state government would be able to avoid
liability by showing that it would have made the same decision
regardless of race.
So, the result in Lesage is not the product of some peculiarity in
the underlying statute. We thus need some way to reconcile Lesage
with cases like Associated General Contractors v. Jacksonville.39 As
noted above, according to the Lesage Court there are some injuries
which are adequate "injuries in fact" for the purposes of Article III,
but which do not injure people in a way which entitles them to money
35. 528 U.S. at 18.
36. Section 1983 provides in relevant part: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1991).
37. Id.
38. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
39. In searching for doctrinal coherence, I am of course rejecting the cynical view that
the Court's holding in Lesage, or more accurately the expansive view of standing the
Court has taken in cases such as Bakke, Associated General Contractors v. Jacksonville,
and Adarand, is simply a product of the Court's crusade against affirmative action,
otherwise irreconcilable with its standing doctrine. For a detailed exposition of such a
view, see Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1422 (1995).
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damages. They are pseudo-injuries, sufficient to permit a plaintiff to
sue the government for injunctive relief, but not sufficiently tangible
to create any right to money damages, not even nominal relief or
attorneys fees (remember, the government was granted summary
judgment on Lesage's damage claim). As Christina Whitman has
recently pointed out, however, this is peculiar. Existing caselaw,
including notably the Court's decision in Cary v. Piphus,"' suggests
that a constitutional injury is compensable with damages under §
1983, albeit perhaps only nominal damages, if a true injury has
occurred regardless of whether the ultimate, substantive decision by
the government was caused by the unconstitutional action.41 Cary
involved a violation of procedural due process rights, and its holding
was explicitly limited to that setting. There is, however, an obvious
parallel between the injury caused by deprivation of procedural rights
and the deprivation of equal treatment at issue in the affirmative
action cases. Nonetheless, in Lesage the Court did not extend the
reasoning of Cary to equal-protection cases, and indeed did not even
cite the decision." Thus according to the Court, the deprivation of a
hearing in Cary was actionable, and compensable with nominal and
potentially emotional distress damages, while the deprivation of equal
treatment in Lesage was not. Apparently, despite their obvious
similarities, the difference in the substantive bases for the injuries in
Cary and Lesage - procedural due process versus equal protection
- in the Court's view justified quite different treatment.
Lesage thus indicates that whatever the language of previous
opinions such as Lujan, legal context, including both the substantive
law at issue and the nature of the relief sought, does matter when
defining injury in fact. Furthermore, this conclusion is perfectly
consistent with the general tone of the Court's affirmative
action/standing decisions, where, as noted above, legal context has
clearly mattered in deciding what sorts of injuries are actionable. Put
differently, the Lesage decision, along with earlier decisions such as
Bakke and Associated General Contractors v. Jacksonville, indicate
that the concepts of cognizable injury and injury in fact, as used in
Lesage and the Court's standing cases, do not refer to some natural
40. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
41. See Christina Whitman, An Essay on Texas v. Lesage, 51 MERCER L. REV. 621,
632-35 (2000); see also Sheldon Mahmoud, Mt. Healthy and Causation-in-Fact: The Court
Still Doesn't Get It!, 51 MERCER L. REv. 603, 611-12 (2000).
42. Though admittedly, the failure to cite Cary may have been a product of the
summary nature of the Lesage decision.
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condition, but rather are simply about a plaintiff's legal ability to sue,
which is a proposition of substantive law.
The notion that the standing inquiry under Article III is
ultimately rooted in issues of substantive law is not unique to the
equal protection or even the constitutional context. As Cass Sunstein
has noted, this idea forms an important strand in the Court's standing
cases.43 In International Primate Protection League v. Administrators
of Tulane Education Fund, for example, the Court explicitly stated
that "standing is gauged by the specific common-law, statutory or
constitutional claims that a party presents,"' 4 and went on to hold that
a plaintiff had standing to challenge removal of its case from state to
federal court, even if the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the
substantive claim in federal court, thus confirming that the nature of a
legal dispute shapes in important ways whether a particular alleged
injury is sufficient for Article III purposes. Furthermore, in the
Federal Election Commission v. Akins case, the Court also quite
clearly indicated that the reason that the injury-in-fact in Akins - the
denial of information sought by plaintiffs - was sufficient for Article
III purposes was because a statute gave the plaintiffs the right to the
information, once again indicating that substantive law is critical in
defining cognizable injury.45  Finally, as noted above, Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan quite clearly adopts this
approach.6 Of course, this approach to standing remains in tension
with the statements made by the Court in Allen v. Wright and Lujan
suggesting that injury in fact is a real, nonlegal concept. Ultimately,
then, one must choose between these two approaches to injury, and it
is my contention that cases like Lesage and the rest of the Court's
affirmative action/standing jurisprudence provide strong support for
the view that the legal view of injury, as an issue of substantive law, is
the dominant one in the Court's jurisprudencef
43. See Sunstein, supra note 15 at 641-43. This is also the position of Professors
Fletcher and Albert. See Fletcher, supra note 19 at 229-39; Albert, supra note 19 at 491-
92. For a recent judicial decision emphasizing the interplay between substantive law and
Article III injury, see Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Security Services, 222 F.3d 289, 294-99 (7th
Cir. 2000) (upholding standing for "testers" under Title VII, based on congressional intent
to create broadly-defined, cognizable injuries in civil rights statutes).
44. 500 U.S. 72, 77 (1991). The Court's broad, unanswered language in International
Primate is perhaps explained by the fact that Justice Scalia recused himself from the case.
45. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21; see generally Sunstein, supra note 15 at 641-43 (supporting
this reading of Akins).
46. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579-81.
47. In particular, in assessing the force of the Court's language in Lujan, which is
probably the strongest exposition of the naturalistic approach towards injury, it must be
Winter 20011
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IV. Conclusion: Congress' Power to Define Article III Injuries
After Lesage, it would appear that whether or not a particular
injury is sufficient for Article III purposes depends on the nature of
the plaintiff's substantive claim, and not simply on the factual nature
of the injury. In cases like Lesage the Court has created a shifting
definition of injury in fact which turns on substantive law, and thus
has effectively arrogated to itself the power to create substantive law.
When the underlying substantive law is constitutional, as in Lesage
and other affirmative action cases, this seems fine. After all, the
Court does have the final word (or so the Court says) in determining
the content of constitutional law, and thus it makes sense that the
Court should have the preeminent role in determining what sorts of
constitutional injuries are redressable by the federal judiciary.'9 Even
then, one might question why the Court should restrict Congress'
power to expand the category of cognizable, constitutional injuries
beyond the minimum set by the judiciary; but perhaps the answer can
be found in the same federalism- and separation-of-powers-based
concerns which have convinced the Court that Congress may not use
its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to expand
the substantive reach of the Due Process Clause and the Bill of
Rights.' When the substantive law at issue is statutory, however, the
calculus changes entirely. As Justice Brennan said in Davis v.
Passman (in the course of recognizing a judicially-created cause of
action to remedy constitutional violations), "[s]tatutory rights and
obligations are established by Congress, and it is entirely appropriate
for Congress, in creating these rights and obligations, to determine in
addition who may enforce them and in what manner."'" And that
noted that Justices Kennedy and Souter (who joined Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion) provided the crucial fifth and sixth votes for Justice Scalia's majority opinion, yet
in their separate opinion indicated that they did not view the Court as adopting a purely
naturalistic view of injury in fact. See id-
48. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1 (1958); Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359 (1997) (defending the Court's vicw of its own
authority).
49. This view of the Court's power is consistent with the fact that the Court has long
recognized its power to create judicial causes of action, for both injunctive and legal relief,
to vindicate federal constitutional rights. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-44
(1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
50. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 521-25,534-36.
51. Davis, 442 U.S. at 241.
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seems right. What constitutes "a legally protected interest,
'5 2
invasion of which constitutes injury in fact, is a matter of substantive
law. It would seem to follow that the power to create the substantive
law - which in the case of statutory law Congress clearly possesses -
includes the power to define what legal interests the law protects.5 3
Thus in areas of statutory law such as environmental law, information
disclosure, and a wide assortment of other regulatory schemes,
Congress should possess the power to define what constitutes a
cognizable injury for the purposes of Article III.
Of course, Congress does not always speak with great clarity,
especially when dealing with arcane legal issues like standing which
even members of the Court (not to mention most lawyers) do not
fully understand. Thus just as statutes are often silent regarding who
may sue to enforce the obligations they create,-4 statutes are usually
silent about precisely what legal interests they seek to protect. In that
situation, the Court's interpretive role of course requires it to fill in
the gaps, and determine the scope of cognizable injuries. Indeed, that
is precisely how Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan
explains the Court's decision in that case.5 Perhaps that is also how
one can explain the result in Lesage: as an unexceptional example of
the Court interpreting a statute, § 1983 (though it should be noted
that the underlying issue in Lesage was constitutional, suggesting that
the Court was exercising its independent power to interpret the
Constitution in denying standing to sue). But if a claim is clearly
statutory, and if Congress does speak to the question of injuries and
protected legal interests, presumably the Court must effectuate its
will.
52. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
53. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1974) ("Congress may
enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no
injury would exist without the statute.").
54. A fact which has created an extensive, complicated, and controversial
jurisprudence regarding when the courts should "imply" private rights of action into
statutes. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979); Superintendent of Ins. of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971).
55. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). In Lujan, the Court denied environmental plaintiffs standing despite the
existence of a seemingly broad citizens' suit provision in the relevant environmental
statute, suggesting that the Court's decision identified a clear outer limit on Congress's
power to create new injuries. Justice Kennedy, however, suggested that if Congress has
spoken with more clarity in the statute, the Court might have been willing to recognize a
new type of injury in fact.
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The question that remains is whether there are any limits on
Congress' power to recognize and create judicially enforceable
injuries in statutes - i.e., whether there is any minimum below which
Congress cannot go. Justice Scalia is firmly of the view that there
must be such a limit - to wit, that any injury recognized by Congress
must be "concrete." Otherwise, if Congress' power were unlimited,
by creating new injuries Congress would be able "to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,' Art. II, § 3 .56 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy seems to
agree with this position.7 Though a complete answer is far beyond
the scope of this paper, I must say that I am more doubtful. To begin
with, the expansive view of executive authority championed by
Justice Scalia here and elsewhere58 strikes me as questionable at best.
After all, nowhere in the Constitution does it say or suggest that the
President's power to enforce the laws is exclusive, nor is it obvious
how congressional creation of new injuries, and new causes of action,
reduces the President's power to enforce the laws. Indeed, since in
most cases where standing is controverted the Executive Branch is
the defendant, the real effect of congressional action creating new
injuries and causes of action is to force the Executive Branch to
follow the law, which does not strike me as being an intrusion on the
President's legitimate authority (unless, of course, the legal restriction
on the Executive Branch being enforced in the lawsuit is itself
unconstitutional, in which case the lawsuit will fail on the merits). I
suppose that if Congress defined an injury, cessation of which would
have absolutely no tangible effect on a plaintiff's life, then the Court
might be justified in concluding that Congress has crossed the line
into authorizing lawsuits which are purely ideological, and therefore
not a "case or controversy."5 9 But even then I am not sure - it is not
obvious to me why the fact that a plaintiff's motivation is purely
"ideological" prevents a real, litigated case from being a case or
controversy.6  Furthermore, the "denial of equal treatment"
56. Id. at 577.
57. See i& at 580-81.
58. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988); Smiley v. Citibank, 517
U.S. 735,740-41 (1996).
59. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 15 at 643 & n.154 (recognizing this ambiguity in the
Court's opinions, but not resolving it).
60. For a partial defense of this position, see Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing
Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARv. L. REV. 603,636-41 (1992).
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legitimized by the Court itself in the affirmative action cases comes
awfully close to being such an injury, suggesting that the Court does
not take this limitation on judicial authority terribly seriously.
None of this is to suggest that as a prudential matter the Court is
not wise to interpret injury and standing narrowly to avoid having
itself drawn into ideological disputes. All of the well-known concerns
about the appropriate role of the judiciary in our government, rooted
in the countermajoritarian difficulty, push towards the Court taking a
narrow view of the judiciary's power when the Court is acting on its
own. Thus the Court acts quite properly when it refuses, in cases like
United States v. Richardson,6 1 to recognize direct taxpayer or voter
standing to enforce constitutional provisions. It may even be that
these concerns justify a interpretive presumption against expansion of
judicially cognizable injuries. But those concerns disappear when
Congress passes a statute explicitly authorizing judicial action, either
with presidential approval or over a presidential veto.62 There is then
no countermajoritarian difficulty, since there has been a clear
delegation of power to the courts by the most democratic branch.
And presumably Congress has acted because it believes there is a
need for judicial involvement in that substantive area of law. In those
situations, exemplified by cases such as Akins and by the many citizen
suit provisions Congress has incorporated into environmental
statutes, the courts should be willing to shoulder the responsibilities
that have been placed upon them.
61. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
62. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,131-32 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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